Little work has been done on long-term trends in support for British political parties because of the absence of comparable data over more than four elections: without such data it is difficult to test hypotheses regarding the geography of trends in such support -as implied by the widely-deployed notion of a north-south divide. Using a recently-created data set estimating the percentage of the votes cast for each party at each election for a constant set of pseudo-constituencies (those used for the 1997 and 2001 general elections) this paper uses a recently-developed inductive procedure for identifying spatially-varying temporal trends in party support, enabling hypotheses regarding the nature of those variations since World War II to be formally tested. The tests show that whereas the varying patterns of Conservative support were predominantly regional -supporting the concept of a north-south divide -there was greater variation by functional type than geographical region in the patterning of support trends for the other two parties.
The issue of spatial variations in voting patterns within Great Britain has attracted considerable attention over recent decades. The spatial scale focused on has varied, however, from small areas, associated with the concept of the neighbourhood effect, through larger areas such as constituencies, linked to arguments regarding the efficacy of local campaigning, to the region. Regarding the latter, there has been debate over whether there are, and have been, significant inter-regional variations in support for the main political parties, and whether these have changed over time.
Until relatively recently little detailed analysis has been undertaken into the nature of such variations, however, let alo ne into variations over time as well as space: the spatio-temporal geography of voting has not been addressed. In this paper, we introduce a method, group-based latent trajectory models (Nagin, 2005) for analysing trends across a number of points in time in a population of observations, which inductively identifies groups of observations with similar trends. This is applied to voting for each of the three main parties in Great Britain -Conservative, Labour and Liberal 1 -across the 15 general elections held between 1950 and 2001 inclusively. These groupings are used to explore whether there have been regional patterns to voting trends within the country over that period.
Region and voting in Great Britain
The conventional wisdom in British electoral studies was for some time an acceptance that there were no significant spatial variations in voting behaviour. This position was based very largely on arguments developed in Stokes' classic (1969, 1974) work on Political change in Britain, which identified a general pattern of what became known as 'uniform swing'. A summary measure of change in the relative levels of support received by the two main parties between a pair of elections -the 'average of the Conservative gain and the Labour loss as percentages of the total vote cast' (Butler and Stokes, 1969, 335 ) -this was deployed in the 'Nuffield studies' of each general election since 1950. It was calculated not only nationally but also by constituency, and Butler and Stokes' data for five inter-election pairs were summarised as showing an 'impressive evenness of swing', with standard deviations around the national mean that were considered small when compared to American data.
Butler and Stokes' analyses were much more nuanced, however, and although 'the electoral tides that swept over the nation left the ordering of regions by party strength almost undisturbed' (Butler and Stokes, 1969, 174) they identified significant and substantial variations in voting patterns which reflected 'differences of party support by class between regions' (p. 175) and recognised that 'we have exaggerated the political homogeneity of the United Kingdom … throughout the book' (p. 174). (They also recognised that uniformity of swing on their chosen measure was incommensurate with other measures of change, which showed considerable spatial variations: Steed, 1964; Berrington, 1965; Johnston, 1983) .
Other studies of spatial variations in voting by the British electorate also stressed the over-simplification implicit in applications of the uniform swing model and the assumption that similar people (especially similar people according to their occupational class position) voted similarly, wherever they lived : Miller (1977 : Miller ( , 1978 , for example, found that where people lived -in terms of the class composition of their constituency -was a much better predictor of how they voted than was their own class position (see also, for example, Payne, 1971, 1976) . But it was the appearance of a much-cited paper by Curtice and Steed (1982) -along with their analyses of the results of the 1983 and 1987 general elections Steed, 1984, 1988 ) -which brought regional variations in voting behaviour to the fore. They identified not just a growing inter-regional divide (basically north-south, with northern regions becoming relatively more pro-Labour and southern regions more pro-Conservative) but also a growing urban-rural split (pro-Labour and proConservative respectively) -a 'pattern of change that started shortly after 1955 has proved remarkably consistent, with the North and urban areas moving cumulatively towards Labour and the South and rural areas cumulatively towards the Conservatives' (Curtice and Steed, 1982, p. 258 ) -plus specific patterns for particular types of constituency (such as fishing ports). Several arguments were assembled to account for this opening-up of north-south and urban-rural divides: changes in the class composition of the different areas as a consequence of economic shifts; selective migration, particularly of those with pro-Conservative leanings, to areas in the south and to the less urban constituencies; the differential behaviour of voters in the same social group according to where they live; and spatial variations in the local strength of the political parties, and hence their ability to mobilise support. The relative strength of these potential influences was not assessed, however.
The widening gap became even more apparent at subsequent -1983 and 1987 -general elections, at which if there had been a uniform national culture of people in the same occupational classes voting in the same way in all constituencies, the Conservative party would have won virtually every seat (Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp, 1988) . The north-south component attracted most attention, especially in media commentaries on the geography of voting, although analyses which located constituencies not only in their geographical region but also according to a functional classification found that the latter accounted for more of the variation than the former (e.g. Jones et al, 1998) . Regional variations reflected, to a large extent, the fact that different types of constituency (according to their occupational structure etc.) were concentrated in different regions.
Although some doubted the extent and substantive significance of the regional variations (e.g. McAllister and Studlar, 1992) , most studies found that there were significant inter-regional differences even when a wide range of individual voter characteristics was taken into account (e.g. Johnston and Pattie, 1998) . But the 1997 general election saw a reduction in those differences, as Labour successfully won back lost ground in the south through its campaign to regain power after 18 years in opposition (Curtice and Park, 1998) . Nevertheless, regional differences remained, if muted, although analyses of the four elections between 1992 and 2005 respectively have shown that differences between constituencies defined according to functional types accounted for much more of the variation than regional location per se (Johnston, Pattie and Rossiter, 2005) .
Region remains an element in most recent analyses of British electoral behaviour, therefore; indeed, regional variables are included in a large number of analyses of survey data on party choice. A number of issues remain to be addressed regarding its importance and changing nature, however. Here we focus on three. First, what are the long-term trends in party support across regions, rather than just the switches between adjacent elections, which have been the focus of almost all study to date? Secondly, what are the spatio-temporal variations in voting for the third main party in contemporary British politics -the Liberal Democrats: to date, most analyses have focused almost exclusively on the Conservative and Labour parties? And finally, is it region per se which is the source of variation between constituencies in the support for the political parties, or is it the economic and other characteristics of constituencies, with different types concentrated into different regions?
To address those questions, the analyses reported here look at trends in support for the three main British parties over the period 2 incorporating 15 general elections, using a recently developed methodology in criminology and psychology for analysing temporal variations. Our focus is largely inductive, identifying groups of constituencies with similar trends and exploring whether these are concentrated into particular regions and/or particular functional types.
Data and approach
Recent years have seen considerable interest across the social sciences in what has been termed 'group-based trajectory modelling' (Nagin, 2005, ix) , exploring inductively whether 'there are meaningful subgroups within a population that follow distinctive developmental trajectories that are not identifiable ex ante on the basis of some measured set of individual characteristics' (p. 1). Most of the applications of these methodologies have used individuals as their observation units -as in studies of educational development -but work has also been reported on what we might term 'spatio-temporal trajectories', as with changing patterns of crime across different parts of a city over time (Weisburd et al, 2004 : see also Eck and Weisburd, 1995; Nagin and Tremblay, 1999) . 3 The analyses reported here follow that lead, seeking groups of constituencies with similar trajectories in the level of support for particular political parties.
The method deployed here is described by Nagin (2005, 2: see also Nagin, 1999) as:
Rather than assuming the existence of developmental trajectories of a specific form before statistical data analysis begins, the method provides the capacity for testing whether the hypothesised trajectories emerge from the data itself. It also provides an exploratory capacity to identify previously unrecognized developmental patterns. As such, it can be thought of as a methodology for identifying meaningful groups in time-based data. It also provides the capacity for statistically identifying the factors that both predict and alter these distinctive time-based progressions.
Such a procedure is exactly what is needed in the current context. We believe that there have been different trajectories of party support across constituencies, but have no firm hypotheses as to how many separate trajectory-types there are nor, save in a very general sense (a north-south divide), what the geography of these differences is. Such a rigorous, inductive approach is well-suited to the current situation.
The goal of the approach is to identify different 'trajectory shapes' and then examine how both the prevalence of those shapes and the shape itself relate to certain predictor variables (Nagin, 2005, 10) . The general structure of the model is as illustrated in Figure 1 where arrows indicate the functional relationship between variables. The model comprises four group of variables. first, there are the observed outcomes, Y ij which here represent the observed the percentage of the votes cast for a particular party in constituency j at time i. That is we are dealing with a repeated measures structure when data on a set of occasions are nested with places. The second group of variables is also observed, and these represent time-dependent co-variates that can take on different values on each occasion. These include time itself, t ij , which is usually included as a polynomial function to capture the underlying trends as a smooth function of time.
4 It is also possible to include other time-va rying observations , X ij so that we can identify the trends conditioning on other variables, say the changing unemployment in each constituency, but we do not do so here.
5 The third group of variables is the unobserved or latent variables, Z jk which indicate whether constituency j belongs to a particular group k which has a distinctive trend. The final set of variables, W j , comprises the time-stable characteristics (or risk factors) that potentially account for group membership.
Formally a growth trajectory model with third order of polynomial of time can be written as two inter-related models.
In equation 1 the observed vote for a particular party in constituency j at time i is related a third-order polynomial of time. The ßs in this model are regression related a third-order polynomial of time. The ßs in this model are regression coefficients which give respectively the linear, quadratic and cubic relations between vote and time. The superscript k indexes the unknown groups and we can have one to G of these each with a potentially different set of estimated ß terms with distinctive trends. In this first equation there two random terms which summarise the unexplained variation after the trends have been extracted. The µ j are the between constituency residual differences while e ij are the within-constituency, between occasion residual term. Assuming a normal distribution with mean 0, they can be summarised respectively in variance 4 A common practice in the growth curve literature is to fit up to a third order polynomial. This is complex enough to capture the underlying trends but not to complex that estimation problems arise. 5 The model is appropriate for data with average values changing smoothly as a function of the polynomial of time; sharp changes can be handled through the inclusion of time dependent covariates as dummies which signify regime shift . ,The formulation adopted here allows each group of places to have a different degree of residual variability and that is why the variance terms has the superscript k.
The latent group membership indicator, Z jk is presumed to come from a multinomial distribution so in effect we are modelling the probability that a place belongs to a particular group. In the second equation this group membership is related to the time independent variables, W 1j etc, through a logit link in a multinomial model. Consequently these ßs when estimated give the relation between the log -odds of group membership and the characteristics of the constituencies.
Procedures to fit this model have been implemented by Jones et al (2001) in their "PROC TRAJ" which requires interfacing with SAS (full details are available at http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/bjones/). This software supports three different distributions for the observed dependent variable (censored normal, Poisson, and Bernoulli), and here we have used the censored normal to reflect the fact that the vote for a party in a constituency cannot lie outside the zero to 100% range. Model fitting works inductively and in two stages. First the models are fitted without any timeind ependent variables, but including a third order polynomial of time for a single group. A 'badness' of fit measure which is penalized for the complexity of the model is then obtained; this is known as the Bayesian Information Criterion.
6 Two groups are then specified and the BIC obtained. Then three, four, five…etc groups are fitted until there is no further reduction in the BIC. This is then the most parsimonious model in terms of groups with distinctive trends. Once this has been identified timeindependent variables are included so as to account for group membership. In practice we had difficulty estimating some models during this second stage Consequently we simply we exported the dominant group membership of each constituency and fitted a separate multinomial model.
The data set used here contains estimated votes for each of the parties at each of the 15 general elections within the period, for a standard set of 'pseudo-constituencies'. One of the problems of studying the geography of voting trends in Great Britain is the relatively frequent changes in (usually a substantial majority of ) constituency boundaries: new sets of constituencies were introduced for the 1950 , 1955 , 1974 (February), 1983 and 1997 elections. However, using the 1997 set of 641 constituencies as the template, researchers have estimated the votes that each party would have obtained in each of those constituencies at each of the preceding elections as well as 2001. 7 Clearly, such data are far from perfect, but they provide the bestavailable source for estimating long-term trends in the geography of voting. 6 The BIC is estimated using the following equation where L is the maximum likelihood, n is the sample size, and k is the total number of model parameters. 7 The data are generally available at http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/sasi/hguk/files.htm and their construction is set out in a document to be found at site.
The trends
The national trends in voting for the three main parties in Great Britain over the period 1950-2001 are shown in Figure 2 . Until the mid-1970s, the Conservative and Labour parties each obtained between 40-50 per cent of all of the votes cast, and the Liberals no more than 10 per cent. The latter's share then rose substantially until 1983, which election also saw the widest gap between the two largest parties. That gap closed in 1992 and was followed by a reversal in the two parties' positions, while the Liberal share declined somewhat. But were those trends common to all parts of the country?
As discussed above, to determine the number of significantly different groups of constituencies with similar trends, the algorithm deployed here produces a Bayesian Information Coefficient (BIC). If this gets smaller as the number of groups is increased, this indicates that the further splitting of the population is producing groups that are significantly different from each other. Once the change in BIC becomes negative, the optimum number of groups has emerged. Table 1 gives the BIC and change in BIC values (?) for the analyses of trends in the 641 constituencies, for each of the parties. For the Conservatives, a three-group solution is optimal, with the three groups containing 271, 259 and 111 constituencies respectively. The polynomial trends shown by those three groups (Figure 3 ) distinguish the constituencies according to the timing and extent of decline of Conservative support. Each begins with an average in 1950 of c.40 per cent. For the first four elections, all three groups show the same trend. From 1959 on, however, they diverge: the third (and smallest) group follows an almost continuous decline after 1959, to an average of only 10 per cent in 2001. The other two both follow much the same path -first a slight decline from the 1950s to the 1970s; followed by a small increase to 1992; and then a more precipitous decline over the last two elections. The significant difference between them is that the trend for group 2 is some 10 percentage points below that for group 1 from the 1980s on. By the end of the period, therefore, there are three groups of constituencies some 20 percentage points apart in average support for the Conservative party, having all started with virtually the same average (c.40 per cent) some fifty years earlier.
The analyses of Labour and Liberal trends identify many more significant groupings, with the BIC and ? values in Table 1 indicating an optimum of eight groups in each case, although in both the ? values indicate smaller improvements after five separate groups have been identified. For Labour, Figure 4 indicates -unlike the situation for the Conservatives (Figure 3 ) -considerable variations in both the direction and intensity of the trends for various groups in the eight-group solution. A number of them -groups 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 -trend in the same way, but from different starting points. Each shows a decline in support which is almost continuous from the mid1950s until the mid-1980s, followed by a revival in the party's fortunes that is more marked in some cases (groups 3 and 4, for example) than others. Group 8 is characterised by decline across the entire period: in both 1950 and 2001 these were the constituencies with the highest average levels of Labour voting, but this fell by about one-third, from c.60 per cent in 1950 to c.40 per cent in 2001. Finally, two other groups show relatively little change in Labour support over the five decades: the constituencies in group 7 average around 40 per cent for Labour at every election, whereas for those in group 1 there is an increase in Labour's share of the vote from 1970 on.
The five-group solution for Labour ( Figure 5 ) is a slight simplification of the eightgroup set. The fourth and fifth groups show the same downward trends as do groups 6 and 8 in the eight-group solution. The remaining three again illustrate the dominant trend of decline, followed by revival, with the former component more pronounced in group 1 than group 3. Because of its greater simplicity, and because the later analyses of the group pattern encountered very substantial degrees of freedom problems in analysing the eight-group solution, this five-group pattern is the focus of the remaining discussion. (As Table 1 shows, this involves very little loss of information.) The major variations in trends for Labour, therefore, are between those constituencies where its support declined virtually continuously over the period, though to different extents (4 and 5), those where it declined only slightly before a substantial revival (2), and those where substantial decline was followed by recovery, more so in one group than the other (1 and 3 respectively).
The eight groups identified in the analyses of voting trends for the Liberals show even greater variability than do those for Labour ( Figure 6 ). One group -8 -is characterised by continuous decline in support for the party, whereas another -group 1 -sees slight decline followed by a revival and then slight decline again. The other six are all characterised by an increase in Liberal voting over the first half of the period -which is consistent with the overall trend shown in Figure 1 . In four casesgroups 2, 3, 4 and 6 -the peak was in the 1980s, and was followed by decline: the main difference between them is in the maximum level of Liberal support. Finally, in two groups Liberal support increased and then plateaued: in group 7 the peak was reached early -in the 1970s -and changed very little thereafter; the rise in group 5 came much later, and the plateau was only reached in the 1990s.
As with Labour, the eight-group solution is only slightly superior to that of five groups for the Liberals, and our analyses here will thus focus on the latter (Figure 7 ). This comprises one group with virtually continuous increase in support, to a high final level, and another with virtually continuous decline (3 and 5 respectively). The other three all show increase from a very low level in the 1950s (with many of the constituencies having no Liberal candidate for at least one of the contests). This was followed by an increase (at different rates) until the 1990s, and then a quite considerable decline. As with Labour, therefore, three of the groups show variations around the main trend, and the other two are major deviations from it.
Geographical variations in the trends
Are the groups displaying these separate trends in support for the three parties distinct not only in their voting trajectories but also in their geographies? To address this question we look at the distribution of the constituencies in each type according to: (1) their geographical region -using the 11 Standard Regions of Great Britain; and (2) their functional characteristics. For the latter we deploy one of the three classifications of British constituencies produced using 1991 census data (Johnston, Rossiter and Pattie, 1997) , using a hierarchical procedure and Ward's algorithm. 8 We have selected the seven-class solution for the present analyses (in part because any larger number made for difficulties in the multinomial analyses discussed below Tables 2 and 3 show the distributions of constituencies according to their membership of the groups by region and functional class, respectively. For the Conservative party, the regional pattern divulged in Table 2 indicates a very clear north-south split. Constituencies in group 3, which experienced a continuous decline in Conservative support over the 15 elections (Figure 2 ), are concentrated in just three regionsYorkshire and the Humber, Northwest and Scotland. In contrast to this, very few constituencies in those three regions, and also in the North, are in group 1, members of which experienced the smallest decline over the period. East Anglia and the East Midlands were the most likely to have their constituencies concentrated in that group, indicating that they were the parts of the country where the Conservatives performed relatively well throughout the period.
Turning to the functional classification, Table 3 also indicates clear differences. For example, over half of the 111 constituencies in group 3 -which experienced the most precipitous falls in Conservative voting -are in the 'Deprived Urban' class, with very few in the Retirement, Rural and Inner London categories. The latter is the only class to have the majority of its constituencies in group 2. Other types are less obviously in one group only, however: indeed the (Ex-)Mining constituencies are fairly evenly distributed across the three.
For the Labour party, there are three regions in which a (bare) majority of their constituencies fall into a single group: 11 of East Anglia's 22 are in group 3, characterised by the largest decline in support for much of the period, and only a slight recovery from the mid-1990s on (of the other 11 East Anglian constituencies, 9 are in group 2; Table 2 ); 36 of Scotland's are in group 5 (a slight early decline and then stability); and 27 of the 51 constituencies in the Southwest are in group 1, with a further 22 in group 3 (these are the two groups characterised by substantial decline through much of the period and a recovery over the last two elections). The East Midlands, Greater London and the Southeast also have majorities of their constituencies in those two groups. Yorkshire and the Humber, the North and Wales have between them well over half of all the group 4 constituencies (characterised by continual decline in Labour's support, but still with the largest average percentage of the votes at the end of the period): the Northwest has a substantial proportion of those in group 2 (a slight early decline and then an increase to greater than the initial average level of Labour support). Some regions are split between very different groups, however, such as the West Midlands, with 21 in group 1 and 20 in group 5; Greater London's 74 constituencies are relatively evenly distributed across all five groups.
Turning to the functional classification, again there is no group with a majority of its constituencies in any one class (Table 3 ). Most are concentrated in a small number of types, however: group 3 constituencies (those with the most substant ial decline in Labour support) are heavily clustered in the Middle Britain and Rural types, for example; those in group 4 (the most Labour seats, but with very significant decline over the full period) are almost all in the (Ex-)Mining, Deprived Urban and Manufacturing types; and two-thirds of those in group 5 are in the last two of those types. Looking at the individual types, virtually all of the constituencies classified as Rural are in groups 1 and 3 (those with the substantial declines to very low leve ls of support by the early-1990s), as are most of the areas characterised as Middle Britain; two-thirds of Inner London constituencies are in either group 1 or group 5; and a majority of the Retirement constituencies are in group 1.
Finally, for the Liberals, Table 2 shows that most groups of constituencies with similar trends in support for the party are fairly widely distributed across the eleven regions, although over half of those in the smallest group (5 -characterised by virtually continual decline in Liberal support) are in either Wales or Scotland, and the Southeast and the Southwest have the largest number of constituencies in group 3 -where Liberal support increased the most. With regard to the functional classification, four of the seven classes have a majority of their constituencies in a single group: each of Inner London, (Ex-)Mining, Deprived Urban and Manufacturing types has a concentration of group 2 trends, where support built up only slightly through the 1970s and 1980s from a low base and then fell away again towards that initial position. More constituencies in the other four classes -Middle Britain, Retirement and Rural -are in group 4, on the other hand, with a similar trend to that for group 2 but with the Liberals attracting 5-10 percentage points more support on average. Of the groups, the smallest (5) is concentrated in the Rural areas, and the next smallest (3) in that type of constituency plus Middle Britain: the others are quite widely distributed across the seven types.
Multinomial regression analyses
The general picture derived from the above discussion of Tables 2-3 is of substantial differences between both parts of Britain and types of constituency in the trends of support for each of the three parties over the 15 elections. For a more formal statement of those differences, we report here on multinomial regression analyses, in which the two classifications -regional and functional -are the independent variables and the groups of constituencies are the dependents. The analyses are conducted in two stages: in the first, the regional and functional classifications are analysed separately; in the second, they are both included in the same model. Tables 4-7 show the multinomial coefficients associated with the separate analyses of geographical and functional regions, plus their standard errors and associated tcoefficients, for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal trajectories respectively. In each analysis, the probability of being a member of each group is compare with that for being in the final group (3 for Conservative, 5 for the other two), with Scotland set as the comparator geographical region and the Retirement type as the comparator functional region.
For the Conservatives, the significant coefficients for the regions (the first block in Table 4 ) illustrate the importance of the 'north-south divide' in accounting for the patterning of the trajectory groups. Relative to the situation in Scotland, for example, constituencies in every other region were more likely to be in group 2 -i.e. to have slightly lower levels of Conservative support after 1970 -than group 3, and all but one region (East Anglia, which had no constituencies in group 3) were more likely to be in group 1. Continuous decline in Conservative support over the 15 elections (the defining characteristic of group 3) was thus more likely to have occurred in a Scottish constituency than in any other, whereas the smaller coefficients for other 'northern' regions than for those of southern England (notably the Southeast, Greater London, Southwest and the East and West Midlands) indicate a much greater probability of a constituency being in either group 1 or group 2 in southern than in northern Britain. A north-south divide is clear, and accounts for almost half of the variation -as indicated by the Nagelkerke pseudo R 2 .
The second block in Table 4 reports the multinomial model that contrasts the various functional types, which provides a much smaller goodness-of-fit. Only two types were significantly different from the Retirement category in having constituencies that were significantly less likely to be in type 1 than in type 3, although constituencies in four types were significantly less likely to be in group 2 than group 3. In general, constituencies in the types characterised by declining extractive and manufacturing industry (Deprived Urban, Inner London, Ex-Mining, and Manufacturing) were less likely to be in groups 1 and, especially, 2 than were constituencies characterised by Retirement populations.
Turning to the analyses of Labour trajectories, Table 5A shows several significant differences by geographical region in membership of groups 1, 3 and 4 relative to group 5 but only a small number in the contrast between groups 5 and 2; group 5 constituencie s show only a slight decline in Labour support over the half-century (Figure 4) . Constituencies in five 'southern' regions (Southeast, East Anglia, Greater London, Southwest and East Midlands) were more likely to be in groups 1 and 3 than group 5 than were those in Scotland: the former were more likely to have experienced declines in Labour support from the 1960s through to the 1990s, followed by a partial revival. Constituencies in Wales, the North, Yorkshire/Humber, the East and West Midlands and Greater London were more likely to be in group 4 -characterised by substantial decline in Labour support (Figure 4 ) -than were those in Scotland: only constituencies in the Southeast and the Northwest were more likely than those in Scotland to be in group 2 rather than group 5 (i.e. to have lost support only slightly in the first half of the period and then more than regained it in the 1990s).
The R 2 value for the regional analysis of 0.43 in Table 5A is exceeded by that for the functional classification in Table 5B, suggesting that whereas for the Conservatives the regional divide was the more substantial (Table 4) , for Labour it was that based on a categorisation of constituencies by function. With the latter, the significance and extent of the variations sugge st a very clear division: Inner London, (Ex-)Mining, Deprived Urban and Manufacturing constituencies were much less likely to be in groups 1, 2 and 3 rather than group 5 than were those in not only the Retirement category but also those identified as Middle Britain and Rural.
9 Decline and then recovery in Labour support was much more likely to be the case in the latter types than in the former -characterised by stable support for Labour. There were, however, no significant differences between the functiona l types in whether constituencies were in group 4 rather than group 5 (the two groups in which Labour experienced continuous decline in support). Table 6A shows significant between regions in group membership for constituencies according to trends in Liberal support. One pattern stands out: constituencies in the Southeast, East Anglia, Greater London, the West Midlands and the North were more likely to be in groups 1, 2 and 3 than in group 5 than was the case in not only Scotland but also, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients, constituencies in the Southwest, the East Midlands, Yorkshire/Humber, Northwest and Wales. Again, therefore, a variant of the north-south divide is apparent: constituencies in many of the 'northern' regions were much more likely to be in group 5 -characterised by continuous decline in Liberal electoral support over the period -whereas those in many of the 'southern' regions were more likely to be in groups 1-3, characterised by increases in Liberal support, and a tailing-off in that from the 1990s on (in groups 2-3 especially). However, constituencies in group 4 -those with a substantial growth in support also but followed by a significant fall over the last three elections -were only more likely to be found in two regions (Southwest and West Midlands) than in Scotland.
Although the R 2 value associated with the functional classification is only slightly larger than that for the regional (Tables 6A and 6B ) the significant differences are more frequent. Apart from Inner London, constituencies in all of the functional types were less likely to be in any of the other groups than group 5 than was the case for the Retirement constituencies.
10 The latter were characterised by decline in Liberal support; the former were all characterised, to a greater or lesser extent, by increased support and a subsequent decline.
When both sets of independent variables (i.e. region and functional type) are included in the same model the pattern for the Conservative party is clearly dominated by the former. Trends in support for the Tories over the period 1950-2001 were predominantly regional in their character (Table 7) . Constituencies in every region were more likely to be in groups 1 and 2 rather than 3 than was the case in Scotland: the only significant differences reflecting the functional classification were that Inner London and Deprived Urban constituencies were less likely to be in groups 1-2 than 3 than was the case with the Retirement type.
This predominance of the regional (north:south) divide in the pattern of trends in Conservative support is not repeated in the analyses for Labour (Table 8) . Although there is considerable evidence of a regional split in some of the comparisonsconstituencies in 'southern' constituencies were more likely to be in groups 3 and, especially, 4 than in 5 than was the case in Scotland -there was much less for the contrasts between membership of group 5 and that of groups 1 and 2. With the latter, the main significant differences were according to constituency function: the constituencies were split into two groups -those characterised as Inner London, Deprived Urban and Manufacturing were more likely to be in either group 1 or group 2 than group 5; the reverse applied to those characterised as Middle Brit ain, Rural, Retirement and -perhaps surprisingly -(Ex-)Mining.
Finally, the analyses of the Liberal trends also show elements of both divisionsregional and functional. The latter produces a significant difference between the Retirement type and most of the others in each of the four contrasts (Table 9) : basically, constituencies in each type are more likely to be in each of the other groups than group 5 than is the case in the Retirement areas. Regional variations -stressing a north:south divide -are also present in three of the contrasts, however: constituencies in most of the southern regions (Southwest is the exception) are more likely to be in groups 1-3 than in group 5 than is the case in Scotland and all of England north of the Midlands plus Wales.
Conclusions
Great Britain's three main political parties not only experienced different electoral fortunes over the second half of the twentieth century but also saw those changing fortunes vary across the country. The latter have generally been presented in both popular and academic discussions in terms of a single change in the country's macrogeography -what has become known as the 'north:south divide'. There has, however, been little detailed analysis of those changes, especially over long periods -not least because of the difficulties of assembling relevant data.
Using a recently-constructed data set which includes estimates of party support in a set of 'pseudo-constituencies' (those introduced in 1997 after the Fourth Periodic Reviews undertaken by the Boundary Commissions: Rossiter, Johnston and Pattie, 1999) , this paper has deployed recent advances in the analysis of spatially-varying time series to explore the extent and nature of geographical variations in party support over fifteen general elections between 1950 and 2001 (inclusive) . For the Conservative party, this has identified three groups of constituencies: all show decline in support over the fifty-year period, but much more substantially so -and over the full period -in one group of constituencies than in the other two. For both Labour and the Liberals the pattern is more variable, however. For Labour, whereas a large number of constituencies were placed in three groups, all of them characterised -to a greater or lesser extent -by a substantial decline in support followed by a recovery in the 1990s, there was another two groups (comprising over one-thirds of the total number of constituencies) in which Labour suffered a continuous decline in support, although in both cases these remained the groups of constituencies with the largest average Labour vote in 2001. With the Liberals, too, five groups were identified: three of them -comprising almost 90 per cent of the total of 641 constituencies -showed an increase in Liberal support until the 1990s, and a decline thereafter, again to a greater extent in some than others. But there were two other groups that deviated from this general trend: one experienced an almost continuous increase in Liberal voting, in constituencies that by 2001 had by far the largest average level of support for the party; the other consisted of a small number of constituencies where the Liberal vote fell by more than half, having been the places with the largest average support for the party in 1950.
Analyses of the geographies of these spatially-varying trends has, not surprisingly given the number of separate groups of constituencies identified, presented a more complex picture than the usual north:south divide generalisation -especially for the Labour and Liberal parties. For the Conservatives, that macro-geography clearly dominates: the further south the region, the less the likelihood that a constituency would be in the group characterised by continuous decline in the party's electoral support. For Labour, on the other hand, whereas there is some evidence of a regional pattern -especially in the likelihood of a constituency being in the group characterised by a continuous decline in support -there is a much stronger differentiation between constituencies according to their functional type: those characterised as (Ex-)Mining, Deprived Urban, Manufacturing and Inner London were more likely to be in certain groups than were those in the Middle Britain, Rural and Retirement categories. The nature of the place, irrespective of its regional location, was a stronger determinant of Labour's electoral trajectory than was the case for the Conservatives. The same was true of the Liberals: constituencies the southern regions of England (other than the Southwest, long regarded as the party's 'heartland') were much more likely to be in the groups characterised by a Liberal revival in the 1970s-1980s, followed by somewhat of a decline, than were constituencies further north, but in addition constituencies in the Retirement functional category differed from those in most of the other groups.
The American theory of 'critical elections' (Key, 1955 , 1959 : Archer and Taylor, 1981 is based on major disjunctures in the geography of support for one or more political parties, something that has not been the case in Britain (although see the arguments in Evans and Norris, 1999) . There, the generally-accepted thesis of a uniform national political culture, in which the geography of support for a party remains relatively constant, rising and falling by approximately the same amount between elections everywhere, dominates. The analyses reported here, based on explorations of spatio-temporal trends using a recently-developed methodology, have indicated that this is an over-generalisatio n for all three of the country's main political parties, especially Labour and Liberal. Different constituencies with different sociodemographic characteristics and located in different regions have experienced different trajectories of party support. 
